The Rise And Fall Of A Central European Enterprise: The Case Of 'Elektrim' by Jaworski, PM & Radosevic, S
In Mickiewicz, T (ed) Corporate Governance and Finance in Poland and Russia, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London and New York, pp. 91-118, Chapter 5 
 
 1 
THE RISE AND FALL OF A CENTRAL EUROPEAN  
ENTERPRISE - THE CASE OF ‘ELEKTRIM’1 
 
Piotr Jaworski and Slavo Radosevic  
School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
University College London 
 
 
Elektrim’s final product is shares’ 
Elektrim ex-CFO Piotr Mroczkowski,  
Global Finance, February 1997, p. 23 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the period of command economy (i.e. before 1990), Elektrim operated as 
one of the largest Polish foreign trade organisations which, during the course of 
transition, became a conglomerate. Since the transition Elektrim S.A. has manufactured 
cables, power, provided telecom services, (mobile and fixed), and has been in process of 
divesting a host of unrelated businesses. In 2000 Elektrim was the biggest manufacturing 
private company in Poland in terms of market capitalisation and the second largest 
publicly traded company after TPSA (the national telecom company), with the maximum 
price of shares at the level of 72,90 PLN on March 20, 2000. Two years later, this former 
blue chip company struggled to survive with the share price reaching its minimum of 1,14 
PLN on June 6, 2002. In 2005, its shares oscillated in the range of 4 to 7 PLN 
[inwestycje.elfin.pl and gielda.onet.pl].  
                                                          
1
 This chapter builds on our previous study on Elektrim (see Radosevic, 2001). However, this is 
not only its updating but what we consider a definite interpretation of Elektrim’s evolution and outcomes in 
the light of its history of the last 15 years.  See S. Radosevic, D.E. Yoruk and D. Dornisch,  The Issues of 
Enterprise Growth in Transition and Post-transition Period: The Case of Polish ‘Elektrim’. Centre for the 
Study of Social and Economic Change in Europe Working Paper Series No. 1, April available at: 
http://www.ssees.ac.uk/economic.htm 
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Elektrim’s case has a wider relevance for understanding the growth and slowdown 
of enterprises in central and eastern Europe. It illustrates the changing pattern of growth 
of enterprises between the transition and post-transition periods. Elektrim had grown 
primarily through conglomeration in the early transition period. Subsequently, Elektrim 
has started to focus on a few core areas (telecommunications, cables, energy). The 
strategic shift to telecommunications has been based on partnerships with foreign firms. 
Analysing these strategies helps us to understand the key factors behind its troubles. 
First, we provide a background for the analysis of Elektrim by pointing to factors 
that led to the transformation of the Polish ex–foreign trade organisations (FTOs) into 
conglomerates, of which Elektrim was a good example. Than we present the reasons for 
problems encountered by the firm after ten years of its operation in market environment 
and than summarise the current state of affairs. Next section highlights several analytical 
issues that are important for understanding the growth and decline of the Central and East 
European (CEE) enterprises in the light of Elektrim’s case.  
2. Transformation of FTOs into conglomerates 
 
Elektrim is one of the seven Polish ex-foreign trade organisations (FTOs) that in 
the transition period transformed themselves into conglomerates. Out of more than 40 
FTOs in 1989, around a dozen have managed to survive and grow in the market context 
including the ‘big seven’, which include Elektrim, along with Agros Holding, Animex, 
Mostostal Export, Universal, Rollimpex, and Stalexport. Although they are all 
conglomerates, they differ in the degree to which they are focused, with Mostostal Export 
and Universal being the least focused. 
During the communist era, FTOs were the main intermediaries between foreign 
markets and domestic producers of export goods, the latter being basically reduced to 
production units. Moreover, they had a monopoly over any international transaction. For 
example, Elektrim was monopolist in selling electrical equipment and turnkey power 
systems produced by Polish enterprises. This led to an accumulation of expertise in 
foreign trade organisations and knowledge about foreign markets as well as about what 
domestic producers could deliver. Furthermore, the FTOs hired employees, who were 
In Mickiewicz, T (ed) Corporate Governance and Finance in Poland and Russia, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London and New York, pp. 91-118, Chapter 5 
 
 3 
relatively well prepared for operation in the free-market environment. Before 1990, the 
economic education was divided according to the division of socialist economy into five 
branches: internal trade, organisation of production, finance and statistics, theoretical 
economics and foreign trade. The latter prepared staff for the FTOs and the international 
market environment, while the other branches were bound only with internal economy, 
teaching mainly socialist economy and management. Moreover, only selected higher 
education institutions had foreign trade departments and the limits on number of students 
there were usually four times higher than at other, “centrally planned” departments. 
These factors made the graduates of foreign trade departments and subsequent employees 
of FTOs a kind of “socialist  management elite”. 
FTOs have also accumulated diverse engineering skills through participation in 
large turnkey projects in COMECON and Third World countries. With the dismantling of 
trade barriers in 1990 and the loss of monopoly positions in their respective branches, 
FTOs found themselves in an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, they lost their 
privileged status of indispensable intermediary, but on the other hand, they had 
accumulated experience in operating in foreign markets and had strong local knowledge 
of the value and competencies of domestic producers.  
Three factors played an important role in the survival of FTOs as well as in their 
growth and transformation into conglomerates [Wall Street Journal, 1996]. First, when 
the Polish economy opened in the early 1990s they had accumulated foreign currency 
reserves - a huge advantage when compared to cash stripped domestic producers at that 
time. The value of these reserves was greatly increased through strong zloty depreciation. 
This enabled them to use accumulated foreign currency reserves to buy up many of the 
firms they represented, as well as to invest into banking. 
Second, the seven largest Polish FTOs were floated on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange, where the share prices were rising fast after floatation in 1993 and 1994. This 
enabled them to get additional cash and bring into their respective groups their traditional 
suppliers and other companies that were seriously undervalued. In 1995, their shares 
accounted for a third of the total value of the Polish stock market, excluding banks [The 
Economist, 1995].  
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Third, trading groups flourished thanks to large windfall profits either as a result 
of being reimbursed overpaid taxes from 1990 or from one-time asset sales. 
These three factors explain why certain FTOs have managed to survive and then 
to grow, especially given ample opportunities to buy cheap assets via privatisation. To 
some extent, they also explain the strategy of transformation into conglomerations: 
financial resources together with managerial skills were something lacking in the other 
parts of the former centrally planned economy. 
Furthermore, it seems that the nature of the business environment, in particular 
the market uncertainty in the early transition period and the undeveloped market 
infrastructure, was such that conglomeration was perceived as the optimum strategic 
option for both, the former FTO’s as well as the acquired companies. This led companies 
to diversify in order to cope with the uncertainty of domestic markets. As Mr. 
Mroczkowski, ex-Chief Finance Officer of Elektrim put it ‘diversification gave security’ 
[Wall Street Journal, 1996]. In addition, the undeveloped financial system, scarce 
management skills and the generally undeveloped institutional systems of the market 
economy suggested conglomeration not only a viable but also a desirable strategic option. 
A business analyst, Martin Taylor, from Baring Asset Management, London, put it this 
way: ‘Given the choice, I would always choose a pure producer …. But because of the 
inefficiencies of the Polish economy, there is a place for conglomerates now’  [Wall 
Street Journal, 1996]. 
However, the internal advantages of conglomerates were not sufficient to sustain 
their growth. In “the post transition” period (second half on 1990s) the institutional 
factors that drove conglomeration in CEE earlier did not operate any more. The 
advantages of large business groups in terms of easier access to financial capital 
disappeared. Nor the advising their member firms with regard to exports or the creation 
of domestic brands did offer competitive advantage. Weak financial standing of former 
FTOs led to search for new investors, including foreign, which not always resulted in 
expected positive results. 
In case of relative market insulation the operation as a big group was also easier 
from the political point of view. The sheer size of the groups enabled easier access to 
government through preferential status in receiving licences in areas like telecoms, or in 
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the form of ‘certification requirements’. In short, they had advantages in nurturing so 
called ‘network capital’. But with the increased openness of the Polish economy and of 
the financial system as well as the marketing infrastructure development these advantages 
disappeared. Even as early as in 1995, some subsidiaries were able to raise capital just as 
easily as the Elektrim itself [Economist, 1995]. With the stabilisation of markets and 
departure form a period of market uncertainty, diversification of lines of businesses 
became a problem. 
Elektrim’s management was aware of all these processes and tried to focus on 
wide telecommunication industry. But the expertise of its management, which was an 
asset in conglomerate period, turned out not to be useful when the in-depth industry-
specific expertise was needed. The so called generic managers, who were able to 
coordinate companies as different as food and heavy machinery producers, were not able 
to manage specific industry in deeper manner: general management capabilities turned to 
be insufficient for running successfully neither a highly diversified business nor a 
specialised entity in an open and competitive economy. 
The strategy of co-operation with foreign investors together with focusing on 
”new economy” business resulted in subsequent troubles for the company. Especially that 
after the bubble, there was a huge slump in share prices of the “digital” companies. This, 
together with economic slow-down of the Polish economy made the Elektrim almost 
bankrupt.  
 
3. Elektrim: a history of growth 
 
Elektrim was established in 1948 as a foreign trade organization. Like other 
FTOs, until 1989 it had a monopoly to trade internationally in its own range of products. 
The crucial decision for Elektrim after 1989 was to shift from being a trading 
organisation into becoming also a production company. This quick grasp of the need to 
migrate from trading to manufacturing was seen in retrospect as being very important for 
Elektrim to be ‘a step ahead of rest of the game’ [Business Central Europe, 1994]. As 
Elektrim’s Chief Finance Officer, Piotr Mroczkowski, explains it ‘To stay in business we 
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had to stop being solely an agent. We had to go for vertical integration and get control of 
producing what we had been selling’ [Global Finance, 1997]. Elektrim entered 
production mainly by taking over some 25 enterprises in the course of Poland’s 
privatisation process for which it paid around $300m from a strong cash flow in the early 
1990s, when assets were inexpensive. It made a profit by selling shares in companies it 
had bought cheaply from the state, an activity close to that of investment banking. CS 
First Boston estimates that Elektrim earned 19m zlotys ($8.37m), about a fifth of its pre-
tax profit, from selling financial assets in 1994  [Economist, 1995]. Its assets even 
included yoghurt factories, milk plants, fruit drinks manufacture, pig farms and chicken 
feed processing [Dawson, 2000 January]. 
During this (second) period the main feature of Elektrim’s growth was 
conglomeration. Elektrim bought many of the concerns it had been representing, 
including most of Poland’s cable manufacturers, which have been growing due to the 
expanding domestic market and exports to Germany and elsewhere.  At the end of 1993 
Elektrim had a stake in 87 companies concentrated in five sectors. Its management wish 
was to expand. Acquisitions were seen as essential to build market power. As one of its 
chief executives, Mr Muszynski, explained: ‘If you are late on the train the foreign capital 
will buy in’[Wall Street Journal, 1994] .  
Despite the fact that Elektrim’s acquisitions were haphazard they were largely in 
five main areas: power generation equipment, electrical machinery and apparatus, cables, 
lightning equipment and telecommunications. However, it also had assets in agriculture 
and food processing, in cement and construction and in seven different banks (1995). The 
underlying strategy behind the conglomeration in the 1990s was ‘to use privatisation to 
integrate vertically’ and to transform Elektrim into a ‘vehicle for acquisitions of core 
business suppliers’ (Piotr Mroczkowski, Elektrim’s the then Chief Finance Officer) [Wall 
Street Journal, 1994]. The idea was that the Elektrim should operate as a restructuring 
agent or a ‘network organiser’ by pursuing a “hands on” approach to restructure newly 
acquired subsidiaries. In the mid-1990s the strategy was to model Elektrim on Japan’s 
Mitsubishi and Sumitomo groups. Like them, Elektrim planned to spin off shares in 
subsidiaries to suppliers, creating a corporate network bound by commercial ties 
[Economist, 1994].  
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However, this strategy was not followed for long. Instead of building diversified 
business group, in 1999 the company entered a third stage, which can be described as 
consolidation, and focusing. According to Piotr Czarnowski of Elektrim, this shift was 
driven by a variety of factors among which the most important were: the lack of 
transparency of the conglomerate, inefficiencies in the allocation of capital among 
different businesses, lack of expertise in many newly acquired business segments, 
changes triggered by disclosure problems and by investors demanding streamlining and 
focusing. Its new Chief Executive Officer, Barbara Lundberg, reinforced the strategy 
cautiously initiated by former CEO Andrzej Skowroński of focusing on three core 
business: telecommunications, power generating equipment and cables, with strong 
expansion in telecommunications as a starting point. This included take-overs of local 
operators and acquisitions of shares in telecom companies. 
One of the key components of this new strategy was to invest in mobile telecom. 
But the outcome turned out to be the main reason of dismissing Mr Skowroński. In 1996, 
Elektrim secretly agreed to sell a 6.5% stake in PTC (Era GSM) to Kulczyk Holding. The 
price Elektrim agreed was close to its nominal price and the latter was not made public 
until the sale was about to take place. This 6.5% was supposed to compensate Kulczyk, a 
Polish tycoon, for the role he played in talks with the company’s other partners. Although 
not complaint with the rules concerning the stock exchange companies, this transaction 
and its secrecy was more a result of informal way of managing the company by Mr 
Skowroński than a deliberate attempt not to reveal information to the investors 
[Gadomski, 2002]. Furthermore, in 1996 investment in mobile telecommunication was a 
risky business: even American analytics did not foresee a market for this service, which 
resulted in relative late development of mobile technology in the US. The business plan 
for PTC assumed first profits to appear in five years. The situation was completely 
different at the time when the transaction with Mr Kulczyk was revealed in October 1998, 
when the shares were already valued at $165 million. Finally Kulczyk agreed to $25 
million in compensation. The PTC case was the immediate reason to dismiss Mr 
Skowroński. On the demand of international fund managers the President and Deputy 
President of Elektrim were forced to resign.  
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The foreign investors appeared in Elektrim in May 1997, when the firm issued 
convertible bonds worth 550 million PLN sold by the Merrill Lynch on international 
markets. As we have acknowledged earlier this coincided with the growth of Polish 
economy and resulting optimism of the international investors. The foreign investors 
aimed at close control of firms in which they invested: managers who were too 
independent and “spoke different business language” had to be dismissed and new “MBA 
language speaking” had to be hired. Moreover, after Russian crises, investors were afraid 
of loosing money, also in the other emerging markets. The fate of Elektrim CEO was 
similar to the fate of other FTO’s CEOs:  
 in June 1998 CEO of Impexmetal Mr Edward Wojtulewicz (57 years 
old) was dismissed by main shareholders, Japanese investment bank 
Nomura and American investement fund Templeton, who replaced 
him with Nomura’s employee Jacek D. Krawiec.  
 in October 1998 Kredyt Bank PBI dismissed Witold Pereta (63 Years 
old), CEO of Animex and replaced him with Jerzy Milewski  
 In October 1998 Kredyt Bank together with Templeton dismissed 
Grzegorz Tuderek (60 years old) and replaced him with Marek 
Michałowski [Grzeszak 1999]. 
All four CEOs except Skowroński, who was 52, were in their late fifties or early 
sixties, working for many years for their FTO’s. Furthermore, they restructured their 
firms in the early years of transformation and brought them to the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange. And finally all of them were dismissed at the same time, on the initiative of 
foreign investors.  
The dismissal of Mr Skowroński paved the way for the entry of the new CEO, 
Mrs. Lundberg. New CEO was trusted by the international investors and her moves were 
seen as an example of a new kind of managerial practices in the Polish economy. The 
extent of changes was described by Mrs. Lundberg’s advisor Piotr Czarnowski who 
stated: "This is a completely different organisation. There is no other Polish company that 
has transformed itself in an eight to ten-month time-frame and invested $1.7bn in one 
year alone." [Business Central Europe, 2000]. Speaking the same language as the foreign 
In Mickiewicz, T (ed) Corporate Governance and Finance in Poland and Russia, Palgrave 
Macmillan, London and New York, pp. 91-118, Chapter 5 
 
 9 
investors, and being educated in Western-style generic management institutions, Mrs 
Lundberg seemed to be the best suited person to focus the activity of the firm.  
Barbara Lundberg became new CEO in February 1999, two months after Andrzej 
Skowroński resigned. She speeded up consolidation by selling-off 70 of its non-core 
subsidiaries out of total 100, only in 1999. In accordance with its new focusing strategy, 
Elektrim was selling-off assets that did not fit its new focus on the telecoms, energy or 
cable sectors. It concluded a deal to sell 80 such subsidiaries. In June 1999, jointly with 
Clifton Consulting, Elektrim set up Warsaw Equity Holdings, a holding company in 
which it has a 15% share, the remainder falling to Clifton Consulting, which was entitled 
to 20% of the proceeds from the sale of any assets [Dawson, 2000 January]. Elektrim 
obtained $62.7m from the transaction and was reduced to  28 firms following the deal. 
[Polish Press Agency, 1999]. Subsequently Elektrim sold 15% of shares in Warsaw 
Equity Holding.  
Elektrim’s share ownership of Chemia Polska was reduced to 21.16% of the total 
votes (Feb 1998). In 1997 the Dutch group, Campina Melkunie, acquired Elektrim Food, 
a specialist in yoghurt and dairy dessert production, for an undisclosed sum. In its heyday 
Elektrim had an 8% of share of the Polish dairy market, but its companies in this sector 
were in the red, running at around only half of actual capacity. Interlektra of Luxembourg 
bought 3 of Elektrim’s motor producing subsidiaries for PLN 58m ($14.19m). The 
Luxembourgians were paying PLN 43m ($10.52m) for 99.94% of the motor producer 
Celma, another PLN 9m ($2.2mn) for 67.398% of a similar firm, Besel, and a further 
PLN 6m ($ 1.47m) for 100% of the shares of Elektrim Motor (Jan 2000). The acquisition 
of Celma was contingent on Celma's purchase from Elektrim of the holding's 69% stake 
in Indukta, another electric machinery factory. [Prawo i Gospodarka, 2000].  
Parallel to selling the unrelated businesses, Mrs. Lundberg initiated a huge 
process of investment in telecommunication industry. In first three months of her reign 
Elektrim invested more than $1.1 billion and increased its debt by several billion dollars 
[Gadomski, 2002]. 
The two year period of 1999-2000 seemed to be the most successful in the 
company history. Elektrim aimed to become a telecommunication group, a competitor to 
TP SA, the national telecom company, and an operator delivering a full range of 
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telecommunication services. It also intended to continue its operation related to the 
production of complete energy objects and their refurbishment. The plans were to raise 
the effectiveness of cable companies by a way of further restructuring but ‘without too 
much investment’ [Elektrim, 2000]. By 2000 Elektrim’s assets became concentrated in 
telecoms, energy and cables with only 3.7% of assets in other businesses (table 2). 
 
Table 2: Elektrim’s assets in 2000 
Busines Electrim's stake in it Value of stake (Zl m) 
Elektrim (holding company) 420 
Telecoms 
Elektrim Telekomunikacja 51% 4,805 
Fixed line telephony 87% 1,340 
Power 
PAK (electricity generation) 38.5% 935 
Elektrim Megadex 97.3% 67 
Rafako 49.9% 52 
Mostostal Warsawa 28.4% 36 
Energomontaz Polnoc 37% 31 
Cable 
Elektrim Kable 70.5% 788 
Others 325 
Total 8,798 
Total parent debt 2,892  
Source: Radosevic et al (2001) based on Erste Bank, Central European, July/August 2000, p. 26 
 
In terms of sales, three major segments had similar shares with other business 
amounting to 12% (Figure 1, below). 
 
Figure 1: Consolidated Net Sales Revenues by Business Segments
Pow er
27%
Cable 
Manufacturing
34%
Others
12% Telecoms
27%
Source: ET Annual Report , 2000
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Source: Radosevic et al (2001) based on ET Annual Report, 2000 
 
The growth of Elektrim has been accompanied by strong growth in its market 
capitalization. Elektrim was the first company listed on Warsaw Stock Exchange in 1992, 
with a share price of 0.35 Polish zloty. In 1996, it was valued at around $620m [Times, 
1996]. By January 1997 the share price had risen to 31 Zloty, bringing Elektrim’s market 
capitalisation to $700m, and making it the largest non-bank market-capital stock on the 
Warsaw exchange. In 1999, its market value rose to $912.81 million. The highest market 
value, amounted to $1,5 billion in March 2000. At that time, its shareholders were mainly 
institutional investors (85%). (See Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Elektrim’s largest investors in 1999 
Institution Country $m value held % of Equity 
Bank Austria Austria 79 6.1 
Capital International USA 67 6.9 
Emerging markets Growth Fund Malayasia 66 6.8 
Merrill Lynch Mercury Asset Mgmt United Kingdom 49 5.1 
Schroder Investment Mgm 
 (Hong Kong) 
China 48 4.9 
Barring Asset Management United Kingdom 35 3.6 
Fleming Investment Management United Kingdom 31 3.2 
Schroder Investment Management United Kingdom 27 2.8 
Capital Research & Management USA 26 2.7 
Dresdner Bank Investment Management Germany 21 2.1 
Other large investors  111 12.3 
Source: Radosevic et al (2001) based on Carson Group, Central Euroepan, July/August 2000, p. 25. 
 
On the asset side, the structure is presented in Table 4. In 2000 it had five major 
groups of subsidiaries: telecommunications, power, cable manufacturing, internet and  
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others. 
Notes: Elektrim shares in brackets unless stated otherwise; ET = Elektrim Telekomunikacja. 
Source: Radosevic et al (2001) 
 
4. The Anatomy of failure 
 
However, these were last minutes of the glory. In less than two years from the 
peak market value, on September 19, 2002 the Economist wrote: 
 
…privatised Elektrim was the brightest star in the Polish firmament, cherished by 
patriots who hoped it would be their national champion. In the past week, due in part to 
the unforeseen consequences of nationalistic “Poland first” policies, the telecoms and 
power conglomerate filed for bankruptcy and fired its management for the umpteenth 
time. [Economist 2002].  
Table 4: Elektrim SA major subsidaries
   Telecommunications Internet
ET Telekomunikcja Sp. VPN - Service Sp (former NASK
(51%, Vivendi 49%) Service Sp) (85%)
- Bresnan International Partners Inter Net Polska Sp (85%)
(Poland) L.P. (100% ET) CT Creative Team Sp (60%)
- Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa Sp zoo Easy Net SA (50%)
Era GSM (51% ET) AGS New Media Sp (505)
RST El-Net SA (92%)
Polish Phonesat Sp (93.39%)
Telefonia Regionalna Sp (99.39%)
Elektrim Tv-Tel Sp (100%) Cable Manufacturing
Elektrim - Kable SA (70.49%)
ELEKTRIM SA
Power Others
Elektrim - Megadex SA (98.41%) Warsaw Equity Holding Sp
Rafako SA (49.9%) Mostostal Warszawa SA
ZE PAK SA (38.46%) Makler Market Sp
Elektrim - Volt SA (100%) Enelka Ltd
Gielda Energii SA (10%) Trasza Swietokyzyska Sp
Source: Elektrim Annual Report, 2000
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These words were written just after the market value of Elektrim plunged to 
$23.815 million (March 2002). In December previous year the company had defaulted on 
convertible bonds of 440 million Euro. Preliminary accepted restructuring agreement was 
cancelled which led to bankruptcy filling in September 2002. The troubles were an 
unintentional result of the policy of Ms Lundberg, at that time already no longer a CEO. 
She was dismissed on May 15, 2001. The strategy of stepping into the internet sector 
failed. The “new technology sector” boom disappeared leaving Elektrim with internet 
firms, which in majority went bankrupt, being bought earlier by Elektrim for a high price 
[Elektrim internet site]. Also telecommunication activities did not turn out to be 
successful. Some of the deals were cancelled as part of restructuring attempt, but the firm 
had to pay huge compensations. In general, the assets bought turned out to be overpaid. 
For example Brensan International Partners controlling Cable TV operator Aster City was 
bought for $325 million when Zygmunt Solorz, owner of the first private Polish TV 
operator “Polsat” wanted to pay only $170 millions. These moves increased the liabilities 
of the Elektrim to almost 6.2 billion PLN in one year [Gadomski, 2002].  
This was not the only risky game that Eletrim played under the management of 
Ms Lundberg. The highly indebted company, which recorded a loss since 1998, played 
hazardous corporate game with two international players: German Deutsche Telekom 
(DT) and French Vivendi. Before 1999 DT was seen as the strategic investor in the 
Elektrim. The pearl in the crown of Elektrims assets, Polska Telefonia Cyfrowa (PTC), 
Poland’s top mobile company, was owned jointly by DT and Elektrim, the latter owning 
51% stake. The Germans, blocked by Polish telecommunications law from owning a 
majority stake, were in the process of increasing their share of the PTC to 45%. They 
pushed for control of Elektrim’s telecoms subsidiary once the law changed. Elektrim 
resisted and the negotiations fell through2. 
But in December 1999 the company chose new strategic partner – Vivendi, which 
was to invest in Elektrim Telekomunikacja $1.2 billion dollars and receive 49% of shares. 
Vivendi (renamed Societe Generals des Eaux, a French company and the world’s largest 
water company) employed 193,000 people, with assets of $43.1bn and revenues of 
                                                          
2
 In Feb 1999, Elektrim disclosed that it had signed a preliminary agreement with DT in October 1998 
whereby DT would acquire a 26% stake in El-Net. On May 19, 1999 Elektrim announced it had broken off 
talks with DT about the potential purchase by the Germans.  
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$28.6bn at that time [UNCTAD, 1999]. In the previous 20 years Vivendi diversified into 
telecommunications, media and several other activities. Its activities include water 
distribution (Cie Generale des Eaux), thermal energy supply (Blanzy Ouest), building and 
heavy public construction projects (SGE), waste management (CGEA Onyx), transport 
(CGEA Transport), electrical energy services (Cie Generale de Travaux et d'Installations 
Electriques), real estate (Compagnie Generale d'Immobilier et de Services), 
telecommunications (Cegetel) and publishing and multimedia (HAVAS) activities. 
Vivendi was a major shareholder in Cegetel, the number two telecom company in France, 
second behind the incumbent France Telecom, offering fixed and mobile telephony, as 
well as internet access. Vivendi streamlined its organisation during 1997, disposing of 
334 companies in the health, cable television, laundry, restaurant and car parking sectors. 
The group consisted of 3371 companies in December 1998, of which 1394 were located 
abroad.  
However, Deutsche Telekom claimed the right to 3% of the 15.8% PTC shares 
purchased by Elektrim in August 1999 from minority shareholders. Also, it claimed it had 
right of first refusal on some of the shares. It blocked the transfer of Elektrim’s stake in 
PTC to its subsidiary and took the case to court. Elektrim maintained that DT's refusal to 
agree to the transfer of shares was a violation of the Shareholders Agreement and was 
damaging to Elektrim as it blocked the restructuring of Elektrim’s telecom sector 
development with Vivendi's support. Elektrim offered a defence to the State Telecom and 
Postal Inspectors PITIP as to its transfer of shares to PTC, which was challenged in court 
in August 1999 by DT. Elektrim also announced that it intended to submit a motion 
against the German firm for irregularities over PTC.  
As a result, DT stopped the Vivendi investment, blocked debt financing and 
threatened to force Elektrim into default on its massive short-term debt payments 
[Europe, 2000]. For a time, it looked as if the Germans would take over. In order to 
secure the deal Elektrim had to sell a larger stake. Fortunately for Elektrim, Vivendi 
stepped in by investing $1.2bn, including $250m in cash, to clean up Elektrim’s balance 
sheet. In exchange, the French got a 49% stake in Elektrim Telekomunikacja and, 
indirectly, ownership of 25% of PTC.  
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In the meantime, DT failed initially to prove legal credibility to its claims to pre-
emptive rights to PTC shares. A Warsaw court dismissed the claim by DT, which argued 
that, as a shareholder in PTC, it had first refusal right on any shares that existing partners 
wanted to sell. DT claimed that it had the right to buy any shares on offer up to a ceiling, 
which would have maintained the existing proportions between the remaining 
shareholders. Elektrim stated in court that DT did not have the necessary approvals to 
make purchase of the additional shares. In response DT submitted a motion to the Court 
of Arbitration in Vienna. Elektrim has since agreed to abide by the Viennese court’s 
decision. The arbitration was part-financed by Vivendi. At stake was Elektrim key asset: 
PTC shares constituted as much as 85% of the parent company's valuation [Business 
Central Europe, 2000].  
Subsequently, Vivendi tried to gain control over PTC: by transferring its shares 
from Elektrim to its subsidiary Elektrim Telekomunikacja (ET) in December 1999
3
 
together with increasing of the share capital of the latter by almost PLN 9 bln ($2.25bn) 
to PLN 10 bln ($2.5bn) [FT.com, 1999, June 10] and taking over 49% stake in the ET. At 
the same time Vivendi converted its earlier loan of the amount of $615m into an equity 
stake in the ET. This gave Vivendi control over PTC by holding a 50% of stake4 [Polish 
News Bulletin, 1999]. Vivendi guaranteed to increase its investment to over $1.2bn, 
which constituted an initial immediate payment of $150m and a second payment of the of 
$100m.  
However, the battle for control over PTC was far from over. DT has increased its 
22.5% stake in PTC to 45% by acquiring MediOne International, a subsidiary of the US 
Media One Group [Dawson, 2000 January]. DT paid between $1bn and $1.2bn for the 
stake in PTC. In 1999 DT controlled 45% of PTC, fighting via the courts for another 3% 
against Elektrim [FT.com, 1999]
5.
  
In December 2001 Elektrim made another U-turn, returning to partnership with 
the DT and signed a letter of intent to sell 51% (and thus strategic and operational 
                                                          
3
 47.99% of shares of PTC were transferred. 
4
 As part of this deal, the Elektrim has sold Vivendi 50% in a Carcom Warsaw SA that holds 1.9% of the 
PTC. After the capital raising operations and sale of Carcom shares in Elektrim, Elektrim and Vivendi hold 
50% each of the nominal capital and voting rights at Carcoms shareholders meeting. 
5
 DT is also present in the two Hungarian mobile phone operators Wester Radiotelefon and Westel 900, 
which at 58% has the largest market share in Hungary. 
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control) of its fixed-line and data transmission companies to Deutsche Telekom for $180 
million.
6
 As a result Vivendi claimed in its case against Elektrim in the London Court of 
International Arbitration that relations/negotiations with Elektrim have reached an 
deadlock and in accordance made a set of far-reaching demands concerning Elektrim’s 
telecommunications operations, including (1) that Elektrim transfers its shares in VPN 
Service and Inter-Net Polska to the Elektrim Telekomunikacja joint venture company, (2) 
that Elektrim discontinue negotiations or any contracting with Deutsche Telekom 
concerning fixed telephony, (3) that Vivendi is enabled to sell its shares in Elektrim 
Telekomunikacja to Elektrim for a market price (Rzeczpospolita 2001).
7
 
8
 The collapse of 
the partnership between Elektrim and Vivendi was made public in February 2001.  
Vivendi (1) brought suit in an international arbitrage court in London against Elektrim for 
breach of the investment agreement from December 1999 and (2) asked a Polish regional 
court to prevent sale of Elektrim’s assets, where the latter would prevent Vivendi from 
“undertaking its rights as a majority shareholder” in the joint telecoms holding (Reuters 
2001).  
Elektrim publicly denied the validity of Vivendi’s claims, asserting that Vivendi 
never availed the procedure for resolving a conflict/impasse between the sides, which 
would involve consultations between the Directors General of the two companies. 
Moreover, it claimed that (1) Elektrim was not obligated to conduct its Internet 
operations under the Elektrim Telekomunikacja umbrella; (2) that Vivendi conducted “in 
bad faith lengthy negotiations concerning the acquisition of a stake in Elektrim S.A.’s 
fixed-line businesses for more than 12 months although it was obliged to present a 
serious proposal in this respect on or before February 14, 2000”9; (3) that it would be in 
                                                          
6
 These companies are RST El-Net SA, Telefonia Regionalna Ltd., Elektrim Tv-Tel Ltd, Internet Polska 
Ltd., VPN Service Ltd and Polish Phonesat Ltd. 
7
 As defined in the Investment Contract, this would involve each partner selecting an investment bank who 
would undertake a valuation of the shares involved, which would then be the purchase price for Elektrim. 
8
 Vivendi’s appeal in the Polish regional court was made primarily to keep Elektrim from taking any 
actions on the sale of shares to Deutsche Telekom before the process in the London Court could be 
completed. The Polish court has denied Vivendi’s appeal. 
9
 Moreover, Elektrim has gone further and claimed the following with regard to the fixed telephony 
operations: “Vivendi has recently attempted in unauthorized fashion to block the important cooperation 
agreements between Aster City Cable and El-Net, which constitutes an unjustified attempt at limiting the 
ability of Elektrim to conduct business in the area of fixed telephony. The Investment Agreement clearly 
foresees the possibility of cooperation and market-based contracting between companies from the Elektrim 
Telekomunikacja group and with other companies affiliated with Elektrim, including Aster City and El-
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the interest of the involved sides to attempt to resolve the impasse using the provisions in 
the Investment Agreement before initiating the share-sellback process [Elektrim 2001]. 
 
This corporate game was played in the period when the Polish economy slowed 
down, which was a disadvantage for Elektrim, which was a far more capital constrained 
than its foreign partners. After 7% growth, the time of near stagnation came at the 
beginning of the new millennium. This adversely affected the construction sector, on 
which the firm was relying and was accompanied by the mentioned earlier crash of the 
“new economy” internet market. The strategy of high debt financing together with the 
involvement in legal dispute with stronger international partners was very risky in the 
times of economic prosperity but turned to be disastrous under economic slowdown. The 
mixture of negative net profit of -1.2 billion PLN with assets of almost 15 billion PLN 
and almost 11 billion PLN of liabilities for 2000 (Table 5) under slowing down economy 
had to result in big financial troubles. In The Economist words: 
“By the time it came to its senses and realised that it had to relinquish majority control of 
PTC in order to stay afloat, the telecoms boom had turned to bust, while its two jilted 
partners, Vivendi and Deutsche Telekom, had their own problems to attend to.” 
[Economist 2002]. 
The financial situation of Elektrim was negatively affected by the move of Ms 
Lundberg which was made in June 1999, when Elektrim sold convertible bonds worth 
430 million Euro. Under actual share price of 40 PLN the option price was 64 PLN. The 
move was presented as a way of financial restructuring hoping that the bonds would be 
converted into shares. Unfortunately, after the end of the “telecommunications boom” the 
prices of Elektrim shares were much lower and these bonds were claimed at end of 2001, 
what became a direct reason for the bankruptcy claim.  
 
5. The Rescue  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Net” (Elektrim press release, “Stanowisko Elektrima SA w sprawie Umowy Inwestycyjnej z Vivendi,” 
2/25/01). 
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2002 was very a very difficult year for the firm: Elektrim almost bankrupted and 
changed CEO several times. Mr Waldemar Siwak nominated in May 2001 as the 
successor of Ms Lundberg was replaced by Mr Dariusz Krawiec in February 2002. In 
April Mr Maciej Radziwiłł became new CEO only to be replaced in September by Mr 
Wojciech Janczyk. The latter was finally replaced in May 2003 by Mr Piotr Nurowski, 
who has occupied this post until the time of writing this chapter. 
In order to rescue the firm, Elektrim Kable, Port Praski and some smaller entities 
were sold for 100 million PLN. These money together with 491 million Euro paid by the 
Vivendi for the equity in Elektrim Telekomunikacja were used for repaying majority of 
the creditors but not the owners of the convertible bonds. The latter claimed their money 
back in December 2000 and were offered repayment of only 60% [Gadomski, 2002]. The 
offer was refused and subsequent claim for bankruptcy was filled in January 2001. 
However, in October 2002, Elektrim reached the restructuring agreement worth 
$503million providing for exchange defaulted bonds for new bonds maturing at the end 
of 2005 and repayment of $54.2 million by June 2003 [Business Eastern Europe, 2002]. 
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Table 5. Elektrim’s annual reports 2000-2005 (current PLN) 
Annual Report 2000    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005* 
Net Earnings: 5,565,319 3,625,985  2,487,411  2,243,439  1,921,797  406,148 
Operational 
Profit: 
-278,665 -481,685  -160,897  -14,119  19,085  100,128 
Gross Profit: -1,201,722 -538,014  -616,482  -439,552  790,610  1,637 
Net Profit: -1,078,041 -462,547  -699,437  -344,139  816,598  -9,592 
Net flows: -567,827 624,946  -432,549  80,929  -107,952  -47,769 
- operational 
activity: 
432,587 781,046  -127,309  -89,656  -113,194  24,478 
- investment 
activity: 
-17,780 717,984  -122,133  -83,730  5,191  -22,236 
- financial 
activity: 
-982,634 -874,084  -183,107  254,315  51  -50,011 
Assets: 14,910,962 7,574,164  6,325,481  6,062,422  5,771,268  5,655,216 
Liabilities and 
reserves:  
10,677,420 5,587,904  5,323,239  5,392,491  4,255,980  4,235,559 
Long term 
liabilities: 
5,759,136 231,024  1,998,776  2,538,454  464,635  832,368 
Short term 
liabilities: 
3,383,133 3,380,896  1,527,686  1,435,048  3,078,199  3,403,191 
Own Capital: 1,050,461 639,267  -73,643  -426,399  453,759  1,419,657 
Share capital: 83,770  83,770  83,770  83,770  83,770  83,770 
Number of 
shares: 
83,770  83,770  83,770  83,770  83,770  83,770 
Book value per 
share: 
12.54  7.63  -0.88  -5.09  5.42  16.95 
Earning per 
share: 
-12.87  -5.52  -8.35  -4.11  9.75  -0.12 
*First quarter 
Source: gielda.onet.pl 
 
Between 2000 and 2001 the assets of the Elektrim were halved from almost 15 
billion PLN to 7.5 billion PLN. This was accompanied also by the halving of the 
liabilities from almost 11 billion PLN to little more than 5.5 billion (Table 5). This trend 
continued after 2001 at a slower pace and finally it resulted in focusing only on two 
sectors in 2005: mobile telecommunications and power (see Table 7.) Due to huge asset 
sell-out (Table 6) combined with the bankruptcies of the internet companies, the structure 
of the company became much simpler. Paradoxically, because of the troubles, the 
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company focused mainly on its initial area of expertise: power. The Elektrim was rescued 
but at cost of a considerable downsizing. 
 
Table 6. Major Elektrim disinvestments 2002-2004 
Date Seller Company sold Buyer Value 
19.02.2002 Elektrim S.A. Elektrim Kable S.A.  $110 mln 
25.12.2002 Elektrim 
Telekomunikacja 
Aster Polska 
Warszawskie Sieci Kablowe 
RTK Autocom  
Autorom 
ZTP S.A. 
Consortium of Hicks 
Muse Tate & Furst,  
Emerging Markets 
Partnership and  
Argus Capital Partners 
110 mln EUR 
27.02.2003 Elektrim 
Telekomunikacja 
Telefonia Polska Zachód 
Elektrim TV-Tel 
EVL Poland 73mln. PLN 
30.06.2003 Elektrim 
Telekomunikacja  
EL-Net 
El 
BRE Bank  
28.01.2004 Elektrim S.A.  Mostostal Warszawa SA   
15.07.2004 Elektrim S.A. DM Penetrator DM Penetrator S.A., In 
the name of third 
parties 
65.600 shares 
for 1,52 PLN 
each 
Source: Elektrim’s announcements at gielda.onet.pl. 
 
The ownership situation of the “pearl in the crown”, PTC, was also not simple. Its 
ownership structure was not stable. According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (2005): 
Elektrim is seeking to dispose of its share in mobile operator PTC. However, 
Elektrim’s PTC shareholding is held jointly with Vivendi (France), and the two firms 
have so far not been able to agree mutually acceptable terms with Deutsche Telekom, 
which currently holds the other 49% of PTC. PTC itself is eastern Europe’s largest 
mobile operator; it had about 7.5m customers in mid-2004, and generated net profits of 
PLN347m in the first half of 2004. 
In 2003 the German Telecom offered 1.1bn Euro for ET’s stake in PTC, but the 
deal fell through when Vivendi and Elektrim could not agree on how to divide the cash 
(Business Eastern Europe, Aug 23rd 2004). In December 2004, Arbitration Court in 
Vienna decided that 48% of PTC did not belong to the Elektrim Telekomunikacja but to 
the Elektrim itself. This was subsequently approved by Polish court in February 2005 and 
as a result, Elektrim itself became 51% owner of the PTC. This made Vivendi to claim 
2.2 billion Euro from DT in Paris Commercial Court in May as a compensation for earlier 
investment in the Elektrim Telekomunikacja. In addition, Vivendi asked for the shares of 
PAK owned by Elektrim Telekomunikacja, as the compensation in the legal procedure in 
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July 2005, but they were transferred to Inwestycje Polskie and moved out of Elektrim 
control. Furthermore, at the end of June 2005, Elektrim called DT to sell 45% of PTC as 
a fulfilment of earlier agreement, but on the other hand in July 2005, Elektrim was 
banned from selling its 48% stake by a Warsaw court. 
 
The PAK (power generation) was another major project. In the beginning of 2005, 
Elektrim possessed almost 42% in the venture while the Polish State Treasury has 50%. 
In the privatisation agreement Elektrim was required to build new electric block Pątnów 
II.. Up till now Eletrim invested in PAK 210 million Euro but there were problems with 
securing finance of 350 million Euro for completion of the project, for which Elektrim 
was blamed and the State Treasury asked the arbitration court to cancel the privatisation 
agreement in March 2003. Finally, one month later, the amicable settlement was reached 
and the construction was restarted. The finance was provided by the consortium consisted 
of Canadian banks and EBRD (227 million euro to be paid back in 15 years), National 
Environmental Fund (226 million PLN, which is 50 million euro) and one of Polsat 
Group Company (90 million euro), which contribution was treated as own resources of 
Elektrim. The project should be completed in 2007. However, on June 16, 2005 Elektrim 
transferred majority of its shares to Embud, its daughter company as a compensation for 
the credit provided to PAK by the Embud two years earlier. Than, on August 2, the 
Embud shares were transferred to Inwestycje Polskie (IP) controlled by Mr Solorz, at 
present, major shareholder of Elektrim. Therefore, by late 2005, IP effectively owned 
40% of PAK through Embud and Elektrim lost its control over the venture. 
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Table 7. Elektrim’s structure in the middle of 2005 
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100% 
Elektrim Volt 
exports and imports high and low voltage 
equipment, transformer stations, transmission 
lines, electric energy, lightning equipment and 
other goods. In 2000 Elektrim-Volt concluded 
first contracts for delivery of energy in Poland 
worth 180 million PLN. Than in 2001 and 
2002 for almost 900 million PLN and 1,3 
billion PLN reaching more than 10% of Polish 
energy delivery market.  
10% 
Giełda Energii SA (Energy Exchange) 
The firm emerged as a result of the liberalisation 
of the Polish electricity market in 1999 It was 
established in November 1999 by the winning 
consortium led by Elektrim. and the power 
exchange coordinates transactions in physical 
delivery and settlements from 30 June 2000. The 
main shareholder is the Treasury, owning almost 
23.5% of equity. The consortium consists of 
another 18 partners, which the main is Elektrim. 
49,9% 
Rafako 
 one of the major Polish designer, constructor and 
maintenance provider of power equipment. Its 
main clients are Polish and foreign power plants 
constructors. The firm mainly delivers steam 
boilers (35%), spare parts to them and to other 
power equipment (30%) and air filters (30%). 
[gielda.onet.pl]. 
98,7% 
Elektrim Megadex 
Megadex is involved in the construction 
projects in the energy and environment,  
feasibility studies of investments, design of 
objects, developer services, organisation of 
tenders, arrangement of financial structures 
and individual delivery of plant and 
installation works, as well as complete turnkey 
delivery of energy and ecology objects 
[Elektrim, 2000 #7]. 
48% 
Era GSM 
One of the three Polish digital mobile telephony network. At the end of 
2004 the firm had over 8.6 million clients, which consisted almost 40% 
of the market and was about 7 p.p. ahead of the two other competitors: 
Polkomtel (Plus) and Centertel (Idea). In 1996, Elektrim, as the leading 
shareholder in a consortium which included  Deutsche Telekom (DT), 
when it won the right to operate one of two new mobile telephone 
licences in Poland [Dawson, 2000 January #28].  
The shareholders: Elektrim S.A. – 48.0%, T-Mobile Deutschland GmbH 
– 22.5%, MediaOne International B.V. – 22.5%, Polpager Sp. z o. o. – 
4.0%, CARCOM Warszawa Sp. z o.o. – 1.9% and Elektrim Autoinvest 
S.A. – 1.1%. 
38,5% 
PAK 
In March 1999 consortium consisting of three Elektrim-controlled 
construction companies (Megadex, Mostostal Warsaw and 
Energomontaz Polnoc) bought a 20% stake for $87.9m in the lignite 
fired 2700MW power generating company Patnow Adamow Konin 
(PAK). The consortium raised PAK’s equity by $100m increasing its 
stake to 38.46%1. The take-over was part of a bid by a consortium, 
which included also the US CalEnergy. The investor pledged to maintain 
the present employment level for the time of reconstruction and 
modernisation of the firm. PAK provides 11% of Poland’s electricity and 
is the second largest Polish power generating company. In 1997, PAK’s 
sales reached $320m and after tax profits of $9m. Over 10 years (1999-
2008), the consortium is expected to invest $1bn in the reconstruction 
and modernisation of PAK’s old power blocks and in reducing 
environmental pollution. 
Elektrim SA 
Power 
Transferred out of Elektrim to IP 
Going out of and into Elektrim Telekomunikacja 
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The problems of PAK had a chain effect on another Elektrim’s company: 
Megadex. Troubles started with the problems in Pątnów II construction. The firm was a 
main executor of the project. Because of the payment problems, the company 
accumulated debt of 53 million PLN, almost two times of the capital of the firm, owned 
to the Treasury only and did not pay several other building constructors. In February 
2002 Treasury preliminary won in the court the battle for 53 million PLN mentioned, but 
the company appealed. On the other hand the agreement to continue the construction of 
Pątnów II excluded the Megadex from the game, hiring Canadian SNC Lavalin as a main 
executor. The future of Megadex does not look promising as of 2005. 
 
There was also consolidation on the investors side. From 10 main players in 1999, 
through 7 in 2003, Elektrim ended up with only 4, with one strategic investor PAI Media 
(controlled by Mr Solarz) owning little more than a third (see table 8.).  
 
Table 8. Main investors in 2003 and 2005 (% of equity). 
Investor March 2003 July 2005 
PAI Media SA (Former Polsat Media SA) 9,55% 34.83 % 
Vivendi Universal SA 10,04% 15.04 % 
TCF Sp. z o.o. 8,08% 8.08 % 
Schroder Investment Management Ltd. 4,43 % 4.43 % 
Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc 4,16 % - 
BRE Bank SA 20,31 % - 
Zbigniew Jakubas, Multico and Multico - Press 7,61 % - 
Others 35,64% 37.62 % 
Source: gielda.onet.pl 
 
Polsat Media started to increase the equity holdings in Elektrim in February 2003. First it 
bought 9,55% (from Mr Jakubas), than more in August and November same year and 
then in June 2004 (respectively additional 9.81%, 5.5 %, 3.05% and 5.73%), becoming 
the main investor in the Elektrim. 
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6. Analytical issues 
 
Elektrim belongs to a group of large domestically controlled CEE enterprises that 
operated in the socialist period and which have managed to survive in the free market era. 
Elektrim, foreign trade organisation during the socialist period, tried to expand in the 
transition period and failed. We should ask why this blue chip became almost bankrupt 
and whether this was fate was unavoidable.  
Here we highlight analytical issues that link Elektrim’s case to the broader 
literature on corporate and industrial change, related to the CEE region in particular. We 
want to raise several analytically and theoretically relevant questions which are based on 
the case study of Elektrim. 
 
6.1 The management 
 
Elektrim entered the new era after transformation of 1989 relatively well equipped 
with the managerial skills. Of course these were not managerial skills earned in the free-
market environment but on the other hand, its staff was trained at the foreign trade 
faculties of Polish economic schools and earned some experience in the practical foreign 
trade operations (see Section 2 above). The president Andrzej Skowroński, who led the 
firm in the times of change, earned very good experience in the East (two years in 
Moscow office) as well as trading with the West. In Elektrim since the 1978, he also 
knew the company very well. His education was formally concluded with his PhD in 
International Economic Relations.  
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Table 9. Elektrim’s CEO 1987-2005 
President Period Age* Education Experience 
Andrzej Skowroński 1987 - Dec 1998 40 MSc Szczecin Technical University 
PhD in International Economic Relations  
Until 1978 academic career 
From 1978 in Elektrim including 2 years in a representative Office in 
Moscow (1985-87) 
Barbara Lundberg Feb 1999 – May 
2001  
46 Wharton School, Pennsylvania University 
Jackson College, Tufts University.  
1977–83 Exxon Enterprises than  McGraw-Hill.  
1983–86 Alan Patricof Associates, Inc.,  
1986-90 Kidder Peabody Co., Inc.  
1990 Polish-American Enterprise Fund 
Second half of ’90: Enterprise Investors 
Waldemar Siwak May 2001 – Feb 
2002 
31 MA in Banking and Finance 
Warsaw School of Economics 
1991-1996 dealer in Polish Financial Institutions  
1996-2000 International Financial Institutions in London: Carnegie 
Emerging Markets, Peregrine Securities and  ABN AMRO Equities 
(UK) Ltd 
Since 2000 ABN AMRO Securities (Polska) S.A 
Dariusz Jacek 
Krawiec 
Feb 2002 – Apr 
2002 
35 MA in Economics and Organisation of 
Foreign Trade 
Poznan Economics University (1992) 
Before  1997 dealer in Bank Pekao SA and than consultant at Ernst 
& Young and Price Waterhouse  
1997 - 1998 Nomura International plc London  
1998 - 2002 CEO Impexmetal 
Maciej Radziwiłł Apr 2002 – Sep 
2002 
41 MA in Sociology 
MA in Marketing and Management  
Warsaw University 
MBA Illinois University  
at University of Warsaw 
1987-1990 assistant professor in Institute of Sociology of Warsaw 
University 
1990-1991 International Privatisation and Financial Markets  
Development Fund 
1991-1993 NBS Bewe Rogerson. 
1993-1994 Creditanstalt Securities SA 
1994-1995 Credit Suisse First Boston (Polska) Sp. z o.o 
1995 -1998  Union Bank of Switzerland. 
1998 - 2002 CEO Cresco Finacial Advisors Sp. z o.o. 
Wojciech Janczyk Sep 2002 – May 
2003 
38 MsC King's College  
MBA Imperial College 
1985-1987 L.E.K. Partnership,  
1987-1989 OC&C Ltd  
1989 1991 director of Corporate Finance Department in Swiss Bank 
Corporation London  
1991- I 2001 BMF SA  
I 2001- VIII 2002 Vice Minister of Infrastructure 
Piotr Nurowski May 2003 up till 
time of writing 
57 LLB Warsaw University 1973-1980 President of Polish Association of Light Athletics 
1981- 1991 Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
1981-1984 – first secretary of Embassy in Moscow 
1984-1986  Department of Asia and Pacific and  Australia 
1986-1991 Councillor of Embassy in Rabat, Morocco 
1991 - 1992 PZ SOLPOL 
*At the time of becoming the CEO. 
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Sources: Elektrim’s announcements at gielda.pl and Polityka Dzial Kadr
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The situation was characteristic also for other CEO’s of other Polish FTOs as well as for their 
employees. In case of economy which was autarkic to some extent, and with the domestic enterprises 
being only production units with no intent to market their products [Smith, 2000], the knowledge of 
FTO’s management resulted in competitive advantage, a strategic resource that could be combined 
with other assets to enhance value. This “transaction” took a form of acquisition of domestic 
enterprises as the FTO’s were one of the few entities, which had financial resources inherited from the 
time of centrally planned economy. Elektrim’s knowledge of the Polish manufacturing companies that 
it worked with helped it to circumvent informational problems associated with the efficiency of take-
overs. Also, the management of Elektrim encompassed general management expertise and capabilities 
that were relatively scarce in the transition years in Poland. Finally, its preferential access to 
bureaucracy and policy makers, especially important in telecom, gave it great advantages over 
independent firms. 
From the outside, the initial transformation of Elektrim might look like establishing a 
company like Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Mitsui - Japanese industrial groups led by trading companies 
(former zaibatsu). However, the business history of Elektrim suggests it did not want to operate as a 
network organiser or the core of a new industrial group where individual diversified firms would find 
significant advantages in exploiting intra-group externalities in cheaper finance, secure demand and 
supply, etc. In many respects the frenzy of acquisitions from the early-1990s suggest that Elektrim 
behaved like some other CEE tycoons who put the opportunity to ‘build empires’ over the 
profitability of individual operations or over the exploitation of synergies among intra-group firms.  
There is a literature that suggests that in emerging markets or economies with undeveloped 
market institutions, business groups like Elektrim may have significant advantages over focused 
enterprises [Khanna, 1997][Palepu, 1999]. The advantages of industrial groups have been analysed 
also in economies with developed market institutions [Kester, 1992][Jacquemin, 1982].  The 
underlying factors behind the growth of diversified business groups are in multi-market power, 
related resources, informational imperfections, entrepreneurial scarcity and policy distortions in the 
emerging market environment [Khanna, 1998][Palepu, 1997]. These factors have played an important 
part in explaining Russian industrial financial groups [Petkoski, 1997]. The case of Elektrim suggests 
that some of the factors that work in favour of such groups are relevant in explaining its initial 
growth. The grouping of unrelated businesses has helped Elektrim to gain market power and improve 
access to outside capital.  Moreover, to help finance its growth, Elektrim moved into banking. It 
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founded a medium sized commercial bank and owned stakes of up to 11% in four others. However, 
most of these were too small to be of much use.  
The beginning of 1990s in Poland were the times of fast and uncertain changes and the post-
transformational recession. Foreign investors involvement in the Polish economy remained small as it 
was perceived as unstable and not secure enough for regular transactions and allowing only for minor 
speculative inflows. That implied a firm like Elektrim faced little competition when it was bidding for 
under priced privatised assets. However, since the 1993 Polish economy returned to the growing path, 
regaining its 1989 GDP level in 1996 and continuing fast growth of more than 5% annually. This 
attracted foreign investors to this emerging economy and the inflow of FDI increased considerably. 
There were also changes in the domestic management. Firms and their managers learned how 
to operate in the domestic as well as in the foreign markets. This stripped the Elektrim of the main 
competitive advantage.  
The changes in management observed in the Polish economy were also bound with the new 
generation of middle level managers educated in the Polish economic schools after 1989. They started 
their career also in the FTOs introducing to some extent new management culture. However, these 
changes were not fully accommodated by the ‘old’ managers, even those, who had been accustomed 
to the foreign trade practices before 1989. The best example of such problems was Elektrim case of 
PTC and Kulczyk (see Section 3). 
The shift from conglomeration to focusing was a sign that, as we pointed out, many of these 
advantages did not operate any more in the Polish economy. Companies were able to access capital 
under similar terms as a large business group, markets for management skills had developed and the 
market environment became more stable. However, the aggressive  strategy of Ms Lundberg was only 
possible because of the high trust provided to her by the foreign investors and subsequent lack of 
willingness to admit that this confidence was a costly mistake, leading to the bankruptcy. The 
experience of Ms Lundberg was shaped in the venture capital institutions, especially foreign, and was 
not well suited for the conditions of big Polish enterprise in need of focusing its activities. 
The subsequent CEOs were educated in the free market environment in Poland or abroad. 
They were relatively young and bound with international investors earlier, like Mr Karwiec, who was 
designated as CEO by Nomura to the Impexmetal. Their role was to rescue the company and avoid 
bankruptcy. This task was accomplished by Wojciech Jańczyk, who was send to Elektrim by the BRE 
Bank. From managerial perspective, we can say that being a graduate of London University he also 
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gained his experience in Polish environment working for public as well as for private sector. This 
nomination marked also the return to the more active role of the Polish shareholders and withdrawal 
of foreign investment funds. 
The clear mark of the next era was a nomination of Piotr Nurowski as a CEO by the main 
Polish strategic investor (Polsat Media owned by Polish businessman Zygmunt Solorz, also the owner 
of the private television Polsat). The new CEO was well established in the old socialist period, 
working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as in the new free market period, working for 
Solorz. To the same extent we can compare his experience to Mr Skorowński’s but with additional 15 
years of free market training [Mizerski, 2005].  
Thus, the stabilisation period coincides with the return of Polish strategic investor and 
focusing on the initial area of expertise – energy. Here, PTC could be treated as an asset, although 
frozen by the legal dispute as of 2005, which could potentially finance the main area - energy. 
However, the action of transferring the PAK out of Elektrim in late 2005, mentioned before, could 
suggest that Elektrim still faces bankruptcy and partition, as the strategy of the Polish dominant 
owners is unclear, with some best assets being transferred out of the firm. 
The current situation is similar to the other former FTO – Impexmetal, which concentrated 
again on its initial area: metallurgy. In 2005 it was bought by the internal investor Boryszew Group 
owned by Roman Karkosik. The new owner delegated his manager Sławomir Masiuk for the post of 
new CEO with the task to restructure the holding. The Boryszew-Impexmetal group is going to 
concentrate on packaging through its two pillars: Boryszew as a provider of plastic components and 
Impexmetal as a provider of aluminium components. However, at the time of writing this firm is 
much more stable, while the fate of Elektrim is very uncertain.  
 
6.2 The international investors 
 
The institutional framework features strongly determining the modes of growth of enterprises. 
Within this perspective it is useful to distinguish between three basic modes of growth in any 
enterprise: generic expansion; mergers & acquisitions; and networks (alliances) (see Peng and Heath, 
1996). Undercapitalised enterprises with limited management capabilities have difficulty in growing 
through generic expansion.  Among the top companies in CEE, there were only few new private firms 
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in 1990s and early 2000s. Mergers and acquisitions were limited to foreign investors who have the 
funds for take-overs, and to domestic companies like Elektrim. The difficulties that Elektrim had to 
overcome to grow independently have been confirmed through its difficulty in remaining a 
sustainable independent player rejecting the takeover of key assets by  Deutsche Telecom and later on 
Vivendi.  
Unfortunately, handling of the relations with two strong international investors with 
contradictory interests turn out devastating for the Elektrim. The management problems resulted from 
this were analysed in the previous section. In case of finance, joint venture with Vivendi could give 
Elektrim access to much needed capital and expertise in the telecommunication sector. Instead it 
provoked long lasting legal battle with Deutsche Telekom. Even Elektrim licences giving it access to 
the telecom market, which the company hoped to trade for access to finance and technology turned to 
be illusionary in the situation where it became the battle ground between the two big external players. 
This legal struggle is an immediate reason of difficulties of the company. Its only healthy part: 
energy, was either transferred to another entity (PAK) or suffered from know-down effects which in 
fact undermined all future activities (Megadex). As of 2005, Elektrim seems to be a hostage of its 
PTC ownership and its only reason for existence may be the unresolved conflict between Deutche 
Telkom, Vivendi and Mr Solorz, all of them struggling to get independent control over the whole 
PTC. 
The cases of alliances in CEECs (Radosevic, 2004) suggests that the balance between generic 
expansion, alliances (networks), and M&A as modes of growth, reflects differences in firms’ abilities 
to control technology, access to market and finance. Elektrim’s access to the domestic market enabled 
it to trade it for access to capital. But this opportunity was lost because of the risky expansion strategy 
followed by the wrongly designed international game plan. If we take a look into the other former 
FTO, we can conclude that there were possibilities to grow effectively, either at slower pace using 
only domestic capital (the Impexmatal, see section 7.1); or choosing one strategic investor and selling 
its access to market (the case of Animex).  
However, the underlying most important problem in case of Elektrim was lack of strong 
strategic investor in the expansion phase: 
Moreover, unlike owners with a vested interest in maximizing profits, professional managers 
gain little from direct profit maximization. They will not be interested in profit maximization per se or 
the maximization of shareholder value as an end in itself. Rather, they seek to maximize their own 
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power, prestige and affluence. Such motivations are more closely aligned with the growth of the firm. 
[Dunn, 2005]. 
Yet, as we can clearly see in the case of  Elektrim,  an independent growth strategy may be 
very risky, especially if it focuses on new technology industries, which may follow an initial boom 
and bust cycle. The management of Elektrim was not controlled well enough by any shareholders 
with clear long-term vision of the company’s future. Therefore, main role was played by the 
management. Their visions were not coherent and often changed completely: from wide 
diversification to selective focusing together with huge investment. From a strategic perspective, large 
block shareholders may not allow for a poor strategy, such as diversification, to evolve into poor 
performance, therefore decreasing the magnitude of restructuring [Gibbs, 1993; Hoskisson et al., 
1994]. On should stress however, that in the case of Russia, Filatotchev et al. [2001] argue that large-
block shareholding is negatively associated with the firm’s investment and performance, and this 
relationship does not depend on the identity of controlling shareholders. The difference results from 
the fact that unlike Poland, in the latter case, we see the environment, which does not adequately 
protects minority shareholders, creating very different incentives for dominant stakeholders. 
Thomsen et al. [2000] argues that institutional investors, who are relatively wealthy have 
strong preference for portfolio management and diversification. This could be in line with the initial 
period of activity of Ms Lundberg and support she had from the side of financial investors making her 
CEO. The story of Elektrim supports also another of his thesis, namely that corporate owners are 
likely to emphasize business transactions and growth instead. As the example the initial period of Mr 
Skowronski and final, of Mr Nurowski, could serve. 
We can also notice one connection with resource-dependence theory stating that not all 
outside directors could have a have a positive impact on firms performance. Peng [2004] suggests that 
only affiliated (mostly institutional) directors play a positive role. (…) In contrast, non-affiliated 
(mostly individual) investors have no influence on performance (…) only resource-rich outsiders such 
as institutional directors are likely to contribute to firm performance, and that resource-poor 
outsiders such as individual directors, despite their presumed incentive to influence management per 
agency theory logic, may be unable to contribute. In case of Elektrim Barbara Lundberg and Piotr 
Nurowski could be seen as examples of this theory. 
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Table 10. Elektrim Evolution –Development Dimensions 
 Stage 1 
Foreign Trade Organization 
Stage 2 
Production/ Trade Holding  
Stage 3 
Aggressive growth  
Stage 4 
Rescue 
Stage 5 
Stabilisation 
 1945 -1990 (1990-1997) 1998-2001 2002-2003 2003-2005 
Management Old socialist; Polish Foreign Trade graduates 
accustomed to free market 
environment; Polish 
Internationally educated; 
Foreign  
Internationally educated; 
Polish 
Old Polish but trained in 
the new business 
environment 
Owners with main 
influence 
State State and private internal International Financial 
Institutions 
International Financial 
Institutions with increasing 
role of Polish investors 
Polish investors and 
International investors 
(Specialised holdings) 
Main Functional Area Trading Production Infrastructure Undecided Infrastructure 
Business Strategy Exclusive Intermediation Opportunistic 
Conglomeration 
Diversified Specialization Assets sale Narrow specialisation 
Relations between 
key stakeholders 
Role-Exclusivity in foreign 
trade 
Implicit Sponsorship of 
stock market manoeuvrings 
Emerging Conflict Conflict Conflict resolution 
International 
Relations 
Russian connection Buffering by state/limited 
foreign ownership 
Majority diversified foreign 
ownership 
Emerging Conflict 
Conflict Inherited Conflict 
Corporate 
Governance 
State ownership Commercialization/some 
state ownership 
Fully private;  
number of key owners: 8-
10 
Fully private; 
number of key owners (5-7) 
Fully private- 
number of key owners (4) 
Organizational 
structure 
Unitary organization Holding Multi-divisional 
corporation 
Holding Holding 
Primary Objectives --Intermediating deals;  
--Bargaining over the plan 
and resources with the state 
administration 
--Building financial 
management skills; 
--Building internal 
governance mechanisms in 
select business areas;  
--Cooperating in Cables 
(initial specialization); and 
telecom (ERA GSM - 
initial diversification) 
--Telecoms (fixed, cellular, 
internet);  
--Energy;  
--Centralizing business/ 
investment strategy;  
--Profit-centre creation;  
--Narrowing of the 
portfolio 
--Alliance-building and 
financing projects 
Survival - Energy 
- Mobile 
telecommunication 
Source: authors except stages 1 and 2 which are partly based on Radosevic et al (2001)  
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The fate of Elektrim is still undecided as of late 2005. As we have seen, at the time of writing, 
paradoxically, the main reason of its continuing existence is the complex nexus of ownership 
disputes, in particular over PTC equity it controls. The question is whether it is enough to survive and 
for how long this situation would last? Although the firm is still on the market, its days seem to be 
counted.  
It also seems that this fate was not unavoidable. Other former FTOs chose different strategies 
and now have good prospects for future development. The problem of Elektrim resulted from a 
combination of wrong managerial strategies, which arguably, resulted from the lack of strategic 
investor, who could have influenced the firm’s management. This, together with market difficulties 
resulted in situation, which does not provide much hope for the future. The deadlock, which keeps 
Elektrim alive could be easily ended with the agreement of main actors: two international investors: 
Vivendi plus Deutche Telkom and domestic one – Mr Solorz. With it in place, the case of Elektrim 
and Elektrim itself will cease to exist. 
 
Post Scriptum 
In the time of preparation of the publication, until spring 2006, Elektrim have still existed. 
PTC shares were transferred there and back: first to Mega Investments and then back to Elektrim 
Telekomunikacja due to the court order settling the complaint of DT. However, the management 
board established by Mega Investements does not allow DT nominated “old-new” board to carry on 
their responsibilities. On the other hand DT covers current operational costs of PTC, what is declared 
illegal by the Mega Investment Board. DT also sued Elektrim Investments and PTC to transfer 48% 
of disputed shares in International Arbitration Panel in Vienna. The broad dispute still involves the 
same three parties: two international – Vivendi and DT plus Mr. Solorz and is far from resolving.  
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